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Tax Policy in Developing Countries:
Looking Back—and Forward
Abstract - We review the changing nature of tax policy in developing countries over the last 30 years and consider what factors
determining the level and structure of tax revenues in such countries may have changed recently and how such changes may affect
future developments.
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century ago any list of the developing countries of
the world would almost certainly have included three
“regions of recent settlement”—Canada, Australia, and
Argentina. Today, only Argentina would be included in
such a list. Did different tax choices have any influence on
this outcome? Arguably, they may have done so. Argentina’s
heavy reliance on export taxes and its failure to develop an
adequate internal tax system undoubtedly played some role
first in derailing its impressive economic progress in the early
years of the last century and then in explaining its inability
to get firmly back on the growth track in the latter half of
the century.
Whether this argument is right or not, this brief story
introduces two of the most important lessons that have
been learned about taxation and development over the last
hundred years. The more obvious lesson is simply that one
must be careful not to kill the goose that lays the golden
eggs—in Argentina’s case, agricultural exports. A less obvious but equally important lesson is that a good internal tax
system provides not only revenue but an essential element in
developing a capable state. Argentina is clearly still working
at this task. In contrast, Canada and Australia—responding
in part to wartime exigencies—essentially managed to create
such systems in the first half of the last century.1
Are there lessons for contemporary developing countries
to be learned from such broad assertions as these? There may
be, although there is far too much that is not yet understood
about the historical role of tax policy and tax administration
1

For detailed study of the Australian and Canadian cases, see Smith (2004)
and Gillespie (1991).
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in the development of countries to explore
this topic further here.2
In the present paper we focus less ambitiously on the last few decades where the
data are better and where the subject has
been more extensively worked. The main
question considered is whether the setting
for tax policy in developing countries is
any different now than in the past, and
whether or not such differences show up
in how countries tax. In the next section,
we begin by looking at how the level and
structure of taxes has changed over time.
In recent decades both technical knowledge and the degree of training have
improved markedly in low– and middle–income countries around the world.
If these developments have resulted in
better tax decisions and those decisions
have made a difference, the data should
show it. We then turn to the central question discussed in this paper: are the factors
now driving tax policy in the developing
world different than in the past? We conclude by speculating about some factors
likely to shape tax policy in low–income
countries in the next decade or so and
draw a few general conclusions.

TABLE 1
TAX LEVELS: TAX REVENUES AS A PERCENT
OF GDPa
Country Groups

How developing countries tax themselves changes continuously. But are either
tax levels or tax structures very different
now than they were 30 years ago?
The Level of Taxation
Table 1 depicts the average level of the
ratio of taxes (including social security
taxes) to GDP for three groups of countries:

3
4

1980s

1990s

2000sb
33.4
17.0
29.1
21.8
as re-

industrialized, developing and transition.3
In industrialized countries the average tax
share increased from 30 to about 35 percent
over this 30 year period. In developing
countries, however, the tax share of output
increased only slightly; indeed, since the
1980s their tax shares have been almost
constant. This represents a remarkable
slowdown. In an earlier study (of a more
limited sample that excluded social security taxes) Chelliah (1971) found that the
average tax ratio for central governments
in less developed countries had increased
by about 24 percent over the previous two
decades (from 11.3 percent in 1953–55
to 13.8 percent in 1966–68). This general
result held true for nearly every country
in his sample. “Convergence” in tax levels
across countries appeared to be well on its
way. In reality, however, by the end of the
20th century, the tax ratio in industrialized
countries was about twice that in developing countries—a much greater difference
than in the 1970s. Indeed, as Table 1 shows,
the tax share in the transition countries
actually declined in the last decade of the
century, reflecting the continuing realignment of public–private expenditure
responsibilities in those countries.4

TAX LEVELS AND TAX STRUCTURE

2

1970s

33.7
Industrialized
30.1
35.5
17.3
Developing
16.2
17.0
47.7
Transition
n.a.
29.6
21.6
Total
19.8
22.6
Source: Calculated from data in IMF (2003),
ported in Bahl (2006).
Notes: n.a. = not available
a
Decade averages.
b
Only limited data are available.

Those interested in such questions should probe more deeply into the burgeoning sub–discipline of fiscal
history: see, for example, Brownlee (2004), Daunton (2001, 2002), Lindert (2003), and Webber and Wildavsky
(1986).
For detailed sources and further discussion, see Bahl (2006).
The term “transitional” is often used to refer to the former Soviet–bloc countries as well as China and Vietnam, which are seen as being in transition from centrally planned to more market–dominated systems. These
countries are not discussed in detail in this paper; for such a discussion, see Martinez–Vazquez and McNab
(2000).
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this century, but it is by no means clear
that these new higher levels will be sustainable.7 As Table 1 shows, in most developing countries the tax ratio has changed
surprisingly little in recent decades. The
belief that some seem to hold that developing countries can increase their tax take
simply through more vigorous collection
efforts is particularly naïve. 8 There is
more to improving tax effort than simply
exhorting countries to try harder.
Of course, there is considerable variation across developing countries. While
this is not the place to go into details, a
recent analysis of the determinants of this
variation in the tax ratio suggests that (a)
developing countries that increased taxes
did so largely in response to an increase in
per capita GDP; (b) increased reliance on
indirect taxes did not seem to drive the
increases; (c) emphasis on social service
spending tended to dampen it, while
spending more for economic services did
not seem to matter; and (d) there is some
support for the argument that corruption and taxation are substitutes (Bahl,
2006).9

Almost half a century ago, Nicholas
Kaldor (1963), fresh from his recent exposure to India’s tax system, argued that
for a country to become “developed” it
needed to collect in taxes 25–30 percent
of GDP. More recently, perhaps having
noted that most developing countries
(like India) remain well short of Kaldor’s
target, the UN Millennium Project (2005)
was somewhat less ambitious in advising
developing countries that on average they
needed to mobilize only an additional four
percent of GDP in tax revenue beyond
their current average level of about 18
percent.5 However, the news is not good
for those who think that a larger tax state
is an essential aspect of development, for
example because of the need for public
investment in infrastructure: the tax to
GDP ratio hardly changed in developing
countries in recent decades. The average
developing economy seems to have been
content with (or constrained to) a level
of taxes roughly equivalent to 17 percent
of GDP.6
Most developing countries have consistently failed to meet the targets cheerfully
established for them by outsiders. A few
fast–growing Asian countries such as
India managed to reach and even exceed
the UN–prescribed four percent of GDP
increase in tax ratio in the early years of
5

6

7

8

9

10

The Structure of Taxation10
In contrast to the stasis of the tax
level in developing countries, as Table 2

For a recent summary of tax levels and structures in countries grouped by income level, see Fox and Gurley
(2005). Of course, “revenue” is not identical to (or limited to) tax revenue, but such niceties are neglected here.
Bird, Martinez–Vazquez and Torgler (2006) analyze both revenue and tax ratios in developing countries and
find no great differences in most instances.
Even 50 years ago 17 percent of GDP seemed like a minimal target for taxation in developing countries to
early writers in the field such as Martin and Lewis (1956).
As Poirson (2006) shows, general government revenues as a share of GDP have been surprisingly constant over
time in India; much of the recent increase appears attributable to always volatile corporate tax revenues.
One of the best documented cases in which better administration increased revenues markedly in a short
time was Argentina’s rapid expansion (from 13 to 23 percent of GDP) over the 1989–92 period. Morrisset and
Izquierdo (1993) estimated that about two–thirds of this increase was attributable to improved administrative effort. As in other cases, however, subsequent experience in Argentina demonstrated how difficult it is
to sustain such increases over time (Bergman, 2003). When improved technology or increased administrative
effort expands revenues, in many instances it appears that political pressures soon dampen or even fully offset
any resulting net increase in tax ratios (Martinez–Vazquez 2001).
The last point also receives some support from the analysis of Bird, Martinez–Vazquez, and Torgler (2008). Of
course, one must always view cross–country regression–based interpretations with some skepticism.
Various authors have tracked and explained changes in the structure of taxes over time, with mostly similar
results (e.g., Chelliah (1971), Tanzi (1987), Burgess and Stern (1993), Bird and Zolt (2005), and Bahl (2006)).
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TABLE 2
TAX STRUCTURES: TAX CATEGORIES AS PERCENT OF TOTAL TAXESa
1970

1980

1990

2000b

Income Tax
Industrialized
Developing
Transition
Total

35.5
29.6
12.3
30.7

37.8
28.6
16.5
30.2

38.6
27.6
26.7
29.7

53.8
28.3
23.3
28.5

Indirect Taxes
Industrialized
Developing
Transition
Total

27.2
25.2
10.5
25.3

29.4
29.3
21.8
28.9

30.5
34.9
37.9
34.2

19.8
40.1
42.1
39.0

2.8
30.7
5.2
23.8

1.0
25.6
7.6
18.2

1.0
19.0
5.4
14.1

Taxes on International Trade
Industrialized
4.6
Developing
32.4
Transition
7.7
Total
25.2
Source: IMF (2003), as reported in Bahl (2006).
Notes: Same as for Table 1.

shows, in recent decades there have been
pronounced shifts in their tax structures.
Unlike the 1950s and 1960s, when tax revenues from import duties were increasing
at a faster rate than GDP (Chelliah, 1971),
in more recent years international trade
taxes declined from about 32 percent to
about 25 percent of total taxes—a shift
precisely offset by an increase in the share
of domestic indirect taxes from about 25
percent to about 35 percent by the end of
the 1990s.11 Trade liberalization towards
the end of the 20th century was obviously
a driving force in tax reform in developing countries, as was the widespread
adoption of the value added tax (VAT)
and the continuing improvement in its
administration.12 As Bird and Zolt (2005)
stress, in contrast to the experience in most
developed countries depicted in Table 2,
the personal income tax has continued to
play at most a very limited role in developing countries. Developing countries
have been hesitant to go too far in taxing
labor in the formal sector, and labor in

11

12

the informal sector has remained out of
reach. Only limited data are available.
In addition, in many countries recently
there has been some decline in reliance
on the company income tax (Keen and
Simone, 2004) owing to rate reductions,
base narrowing due to incentive polices,
and declines in reported profitability. The
long–term story with respect to income
taxes has been the continued inability of
the tax administration in less–developed
countries to administer such taxes effectively. Much the same is true with respect
to property taxes.
What Do These Trends Tell Us?
Has the failure to mobilize resources
through taxation at the margin been
growth–enhancing or growth–retarding?
There is no agreement on this subject.
Some argue that the failure to mobilize
more resources has constrained governments from extending the quantity and
improving the quality of public services

The minor importance of trade taxes in transitional countries is one reason it is useful to separate this group
of countries out in the tables.
See Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) on the substitution of VAT for trade taxes, and Bird and Gendron (2007) for
a detailed discussion of the VAT in developing and transitional countries in recent years.
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delivered or unburdening themselves
from heavy debt.13 More specific to the
question of economic development, lower
taxes may constrain infrastructure investments to suboptimal levels and retard
industrial development. Lower taxes in
some cases have led to lower primary
surpluses than are optimal, especially
when combined with high debt burdens,
a matter of much concern to organizations
like the IMF (2006).14 Others argue that
lower taxes keep money in private hands
where it is more likely to find its way into
investment and job creation. This camp
also holds that government expenditures
in the developing countries are biased
toward consumption and likely to crowd
out private investment and, hence, hamper growth.
Empirical work on the impact of tax
levels on growth in developing countries
has come to no firm conclusions. Even
endogenous growth models that allow for
the effects of tax policy on growth do not
give a consensus answer about whether
higher taxes crowd out faster rates of
economic growth (Tanzi and Zee, 1997;
Mintz, 2003). It is difficult to separate the
effect of the level of taxes from the level
of expenditures and the budget balance.
Not surprisingly, different model specifications produce different results.
The effect of tax structure on economic
growth is an equally unresolved issue.
In theory, distortions in the tax structure
can impose a drag on the economy. Using
computable general equilibrium models,
the welfare cost of some taxes in some
developing countries has been estimated
to be more than 100 percent of the amount
of tax raised.15 Others point to the stimulus
effects of tax rate reductions. The evidence

13

14
15
16

here is also not clear. Ivanova, Keen and
Klemm (2005), for example, find no evidence of a supply–side effect from Russia’s
rate reduction and adoption of a flat rate
income tax, but Martinez–Vazquez, Rider
and Wallace (2008) do find evidence of a
labor supply effect.16 As Lindert (2003)
shows in historical context, the effects of
taxes in particular country settings often
depend on very detailed characteristics
of tax design and implementation that
are not easily captured in econometric
models.
DETERMINANTS OF TAX POLICY
CHOICES
Looking back to the 1970s, the prescriptions for good tax policy dispensed
to developing countries by consultants
and donors, when they did not amount
simply to saying “copy my country,” did
not stray far from Adam Smith’s maxims
for a good tax (Goode, 1993). The recipients of such advice quickly adopted the
rhetoric. Politicians almost everywhere
swore that their proposed reform would
be easier to understand and administer
and would distribute any increase in tax
burdens in an equitable way. Only the
neutrality maxim failed to make much
headway in reform rhetoric. Most policy
makers (and not just those in developing
countries) wanted to hold open the option
to use tax policy for social, economic and
political engineering. Significant gaps are
observable between the policies recommended by experts (whether international
or local), the rhetoric of local politicians,
and what was actually implemented.
In practice, tax policy is usually heavily
shaped by past decisions and frequently

This is the view taken in such documents as UN Millennium (2005). For a skeptical view of the case for such
state–driven “big pushes” for development, see Easterly (2006).
The primary budget surplus is the surplus excluding interest payments on debt.
For a good country study, see Rutherford, Light and Barrera (2005).
For a recent review of the Eastern European experience with flat taxes, see Gray, Lane, and Varoudakis
(2007).
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overtaken by current events. Economic,
administrative, political, and social realities have always shaped tax policy decisions and constrained what could be done.
We note here three such factors that were
important in the 1970s.

economic and fiscal policies (e.g., eliminate protectionist measures, devalue,
privatize, reduce public employment
rolls, and enforce the tax system) than to
adopt short–term fixes. The reason for this
reluctance to do “the right thing” is clear:
in developing as in developed countries,
fundamental reforms are almost always
painful to at least some groups, and politicians generally have short political lives
(and, hence, high discount rates).

Deficits
A critical constraint on tax reform in
most developing countries has long been
their precarious macroeconomic condition (World Bank, 1988). Slow economic
growth was accompanied by pressures
to upgrade deficient public service levels
and to invest in infrastructure that would
enhance growth. But revenue growth was
slow because of slow economic growth,
a tax base that was hard to reach, and a
weak tax administration. Often, it was
easier to raise revenues from foreign
grants, borrowing or financial measures
like seigniorage and inflation than from
taxes. The result was a cycle of low revenue growth, deficits, and ever–increasing
debt service and repayment claims on
available revenues.
When countries are in this situation,
structural reform inevitably takes a
backseat to revenue enhancement and
tax changes that generate quick revenue
flows, such as increases in excise taxes
or taxes on financial transactions,17 are
favored over the conventional policy
advice for broader–based taxes, rate
structures that would improve the built–in
elasticity of the tax system, and improved
tax administration. In particular, countries
have often proved all too willing to fall
back on the “perennial” excises (petroleum, tobacco, liquor, and beer) where
administration is easy and revenue more
or less certain. It has been much more
difficult for countries to adopt prudent
17
18

Tax Administration
In most developing countries, tax
administration was in a poor state in
the 1970s (Radian, 1980). Tax bases were
grossly under–assessed, collection rates
were low, and penalties existed more in
law than in fact. In some countries, tax evasion was seen to be more a badge of honor
than a crime. Low tax morale (Frey, 2002)
combined with inadequate and unwilling
enforcement to produce an adverse “tax
culture” (Edling and Nguyen–Thanh,
2006). Staff was underpaid and under–
skilled, recordkeeping was manual,
modern procedures for assessment and
collections were not in place, and tax
systems were often so complex that they
made a bad situation worse.
Faced with such realities, some countries (and advisors) opted to concentrate
on improving tax administration, others
attempted to devise tax systems that
could work with bad tax administration,
and still others continued to ignore the
interdependence of tax policy and tax
administration.18
Foreign Advisors
To some extent tax policy in some countries in the latter part of the 20th century

For example, the bank debit taxes in Latin America (Arbelaez, Burman, and Zuluaga, 2005).
For our own (partly contrasting) early views on these issues, see Bahl and Martinez Vazquez (1992) and Bird
(1989). For a recent overview of the administrative dimension of tax reform in developing countries, see Bird
(2004).
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was influenced by foreign advisors. The
role of such advisors was presumably
never to substitute for government decision makers or politicians, but simply to
bring the best thinking about tax policy
to bear—for example, in Indonesia in
the early 1980s (Gillis, 1985). In some
instances, advisors also paid considerable
attention to the details needed to help
make the case for those who would have
to sell the reform (Bahl, 1991). In other
cases, their contributions shifted and often
lifted the level of the debate even if their
specific proposals rarely made it into law
(Shoup, 1989; Musgrave and Gillis, 1971).
Sometimes outside advisors may have
served a useful role in bringing unpopular
messages that government officials did
not want to embrace in public but were
not unwilling to have “forced” upon them
(e.g., raise the gasoline tax rate, eliminate
certain exemptions from the VAT, or
reduce protective tariffs)—or at least this
is a common rationalization put forth by
those who (like us) have at times carried
the banner of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) into fiscal battles around the
world.
Where the contribution of such advisors
was positive, it was usually more from the
cumulative effects of exposing policymakers to elements of what had to be done to
get good tax policy than from the success
of any particular set of specific tax structure proposals. In the best cases, good tax
policy eventually got into the ring with
good tax politics. What seemed at first to
be radical and unthinkable in the context
of a particular country came over time to
be seen as within the feasible choice set.
An example was the introduction of a
flat rate broad–based individual income
tax into policy discussion in Jamaica in
19

1984. At first viewed with shock owing
to its clear departure from the existing
progressive system of statutory rates
(applied to a base riddled with exemptions), over time the proposal gained
acceptance and was adopted in 1986 (Bahl,
1991).
Two groups of external advisors tilled
these fields. One group consisted of
scholars who studied the tax system in
question, usually doing much of their
work in the field while drawing on their
analytical knowledge and accumulated
experience. They developed and substantiated a tax reform program, usually
complete with revenue estimates, burden
projections, and estimates of the potential economic effects. The path breaking
missions led by Carl Shoup to Japan in
1949–50 and Venezuela in 1958–59 and
by Richard Musgrave to Colombia in
1968 and Bolivia in 1976 created models
on which future tax studies would build.19
The strength, and the weakness, of this
approach to tax reform is that the advisor
could fly home after the assignment was
over. Unencumbered by considerations
such as “selling” the reform to interest
groups, politicians, or the general public,
advisors were insulated from the political consequences of tax policy changes,
but could also be objective. On the other
hand, they were not always constrained to
be realistic. In the long run, undoubtedly
the most valuable contribution of scholars
such as Shoup and Musgrave as well as
such other important early contributors as
Arnold Harberger (1989) was that by publishing their policy studies they helped to
train a generation of students, from both
developed and developing countries, who
influenced tax policy discussions and
design for years to come.

On the various Shoup missions, see papers by Shoup, Gillis, McLure, and Nakazato in Eden (1991). Although
Musgrave’s missions have not as yet received a similar retrospective view, see McLure and Zodrow (1997)
with respect to Colombia. For examples of missions based in part on these early formative experiences, see
Bahl (1991) and Bahl and Wallace (2007) on Jamaica, Gillis (1989) on Indonesia, and McLure, Mutti, Thuronyi,
and Zodrow (1990) on Colombia.
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In contrast to this first group of advisors, whose work was largely financed
directly or indirectly by the countries in
question, a second group of advisors came
from such bilateral donors as USAID and
such international agencies as the IMF, the
World Bank, and the regional development banks. Advice from these sources
was usually delivered by staff or consultants—sometimes members of the first
group mentioned—who had considerable
expertise and experience. In contrast to
the purely scholarly work, however, such
advisors were sometimes driven to a much
greater extent by such goals as reducing
the fiscal deficit or promoting the private
sector, in part at least in response to the
political imperatives under which they
operated. Although some (e.g., Emran and
Stiglitz, 2005) have recently argued that
the connections between the tax policies
advocated by international agencies and
positive developmental outcomes are by
no means clear, at the time most advisors
undoubtedly believed that such policies
would help countries achieve a more
sustainable growth path.
Fiscal policy became such an important and distinct component of economic
development policy that a fiscal affairs
department (FAD) was established in the
IMF in the mid–1960s largely to provide
technical assistance in both tax policy and
tax administration. Many of those later
prominent in giving tax advice around the
world served part of their apprenticeship
at FAD. FAD’s work as a whole played an
important role in shaping tax structure
and tax administration practices in many
developing countries. For example, it is
highly unlikely that either VATs or LTUs
(Large Taxpayer Units) would have been
so widely and quickly adopted around
the world without the aid and influence of FAD. Although long–time FAD
20

Director Vito Tanzi (1994) once noted,
quite correctly, that in the end what any
country chose to do with respect to tax
policy was its decision, this argument is
a bit ingenuous with respect to the many
small countries in which not only was the
fiscal reform agenda at times largely set
by IMF concern with the fiscal balance,
but the major intellectual input into the
reform program also emanated from the
same source.
Have Things Changed?
Some of the factors just mentioned seem
less relevant today. For example, perhaps
in part because the lessons have been so
well learned, tax reform in most developing countries is less driven by fiscal crises
now than in the past. Budgets are more
under control in most developing countries than was the rule 30 years ago.20 On
the other hand, as we discuss below, trade
mobilization and capital mobility have
created new revenue problems for many
developing countries, and new challenges
for tax policy.
Concern with vertical equity and progressivity also plays a smaller role with
respect to tax reform than in earlier years
(Bird and Zolt, 2005). Tax administrations
in most developing countries are not up to
the task of implementing taxes intended
to redistribute income away from the rich
and upper middle class, such as capital
gains taxes, a comprehensive progressive
income tax, or a property tax assessed at
full market values. Even if a nominally
progressive system is implemented, its
impacts may sometimes be regressive,
as when higher corporate tax rates result
in capital flight and job losses. Across
much of the political spectrum, many
experts and an increasing number of
policymakers now accept that for the

Not all: for example, Central America is still plagued by chronic fiscal deficits, increases in public debt and
generally low rates of revenue mobilization (Agosin, Schneider, and Machado, 2006); see Instituto (2007) for
a recent detailed study of this region.
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surrender to tax administration constraints. Sometimes the battle never even
starts. One example is the failure to tax
capital gains, which still is a major loophole in the tax systems in most developing
countries.24 A second is the failure to establish a property tax that generates a respectable level of revenue. The combination
of the need for judgmental assessments
in the absence of good information on
property values and popular opposition
to a tax on unrealized income is hard to
overcome. Finally, there is the continued
inability of income tax administrations
to sweep the informal sector into the tax
net.

most part distributional concerns are
better addressed on the expenditure side
of the budget, where benefits may be
better targeted to low–income people.21
With respect to the revenue side of the
budget, perhaps the main consensus view
now when it comes to distribution is that
taxes should not unduly burden the very
poor.22
On the other hand, although tax administration has come a long way in many
developing countries over the last three
decades (Bird and Zolt, 2007), there is
still much to be done. For example, most
developing countries have adopted a
modern value added tax (VAT). However,
there are many ways in which VATs can
and should be improved in most developing and transitional countries, in part by
ensuring that VAT design is more in tune
with the real capabilities of VAT administration and in part by providing a better
defence against the common tendency to
narrow the VAT tax base by expanding
exemptions and zero–rating as the years
go by (Edmiston and Bird, 2007). Nonetheless, there is no question that the VAT is
now properly considered central to a good
tax system in most countries. Similarly,
while the assessment of taxable income
in developing countries continues to
move closer to the OECD practice (OECD
2006b) in some respects, for example, with
respect to the taxation of capital income,
some variant of “dual income taxation”
may fit better with the economic and
administrative realities of many developing countries than either the “classical” or
“comprehensive” traditional models of
income taxation (Boadway, 2005).23
Despite the improvements, there remain
areas where good tax policy continues to

21
22
23

24
25

The Wicksellian Connection
A long–standing question in public
finance concerns the linkage between revenues and expenditures and particularly
the direction of causation. Many would
like to believe in a classic theory of the
state in which government expenditures
are determined based on citizen preferences and a budget constraint and the
efficient level of taxation emerges from
this calculus.25 This model is far too simple
to explain reality in any country, but an
increasing number of analysts are exploring the many complex ways in which
demands for expenditures and acceptance of taxes are linked with each other
and with the rate of economic growth.
While much of this work has focused on
more developed countries (e.g., Lindert,
2003), some attention is beginning to be
paid to developing countries (Lieberman, 2003; Brautigam, Fjeldstad, and
Moore, 2008). In particular, scholars are
increasingly paying close attention to

Compare, for example, the recent surveys by Heady (2004), Moore (2004) and Toye (2000).
See, for example, the recent study of taxation in Latin America by CEPAL (2006).
A particularly interesting experiment along these lines was launched in Uruguay in 2007, with the introduction
of a “dual rate” dual income tax: see Barreix and Roca (2007).
As indeed it is also in many developed countries: see OECD (2008a).
For a review of competing theories of the growth of government, see Mueller (2003).
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earmarking (Bird and Jun, 2005), and most
importantly, perhaps, by the continuing
worldwide discussion of decentralization issues. In the future, Wicksell may
perhaps come to play a larger role in our
thinking about tax policy in developing
countries (Bird, 2007). At present, however, for the most part tax policy is largely
considered in almost complete isolation
from the expenditure side of the budget
in most developing (as in most developed)
countries.

the manifold ways in which tax structure
and tax administration constitute one of
the primary interfaces between the state
and its citizens.26 The level and structure
of taxation in any country at a particular
point in time invariably reflects in part
a sort of “fiscal equilibrium” attained
between conflicting interests. However,
the specific taxes utilized and how they
are implemented may over time alter that
equilibrium and, hence, in turn influence
future tax levels and structures. Tax policy
not only emerges from the political arena,
but to some extent may influence the way
in which policy decisions are made within
that arena.
There is a more cynical view: the
process of budget determination at
the margin is driven primarily by revenue determination. The level of taxes in
low–income countries is held down by a
political system that seems to favor lower
taxes over higher public service levels, by
administrative failings, and by perceived
and real constraints from international
competition. Note from Table 1 that the
tax ratio meter has for nearly a quarter of a
century been stuck at about 33 percent for
industrial countries and about 17 percent
for developing countries.
None of this is to say that the process of budget determination will not
change. Although Wicksellian concepts
about linking expenditures and revenues
(Breton, 1996) have had little effect on tax
policy in developing countries to date, the
increasing attention being paid to public
expenditure management may eventually
change public attitudes about willingness
to tax. This shift in interest is indicated by
recent work on tax expenditures in developing countries (Swift, 2006), by attempts
by agencies such as the World Bank to
take public expenditure determination
more seriously, by more attention to the
potential benefits (as well as problems) of
26

THE NEW SETTING FOR TAX
REFORM
Good tax policy influences economic
development, but economic development
also influences the way we think about
tax policy. As economies have developed
and as the world economy has changed
over the past three decades, tax policy
choices and tax policy decisions have
also changed. This does not mean that the
need for revenue is a less important driver
of tax reforms than in the past. In many
developing countries, tax levels are still
clearly too low to support the delivery of
an adequate package of public services. In
some cases, present debt levels are unsustainable at current levels of tax effort. The
old problems persist, but the setting has
changed. We outline next several components of the new setting and discuss their
implications for tax policy.
Who Does the Thinking?
Developing countries are now properly
much less reliant on foreign advisors
than was the case in an earlier day. Not
only are their own policy staffs better
trained and more experienced, but they
are also less dependent on the IMF and
other creditors and, hence, less likely to
want or heed advice from donors and

For three very different examples, see Sokoloff and Zolt (2006), Hoffman and Gibson (2005), and Bird and Ebel
(2007).
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percent. Over this period, collections from
direct taxes in Latin America increased by
only five percent, from 4.0 to 4.2 percent of
GDP (Lora and Cardenas, 2006).
In contrast to 30 years ago, most developing countries now seek to attract foreign
direct investment (FDI) to stimulate technological progress and economic growth.
The literature suggests that host–country
tax rates matter, and that tax rate elasticities of FDI are roughly about –0.6
(Echavarria and Zodrow, 2005). On the
other hand, it appears that home country
tax rates (the Treasury transfer effect) are
not very important (Slemrod, 1990).27 An
obvious implication is that an investment–
attracting strategy might be to provide
preferential tax treatment for foreign vs.
domestic corporations, as China has done
for many years. Of course, such policies
are open to both criticism and abuse: for
instance, it is not difficult for domestic
firms to look “foreign” when it is fiscally
advantageous to do so. For such reasons,
China is scheduled to eliminate its current
preferential treatment in 2008.
Trade liberalization and compliance
with World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules and trade agreements are another
new limiting factor on tax reform. As Table
2 shows, the reliance on international
trade taxes is coming down as tariffs fall,
so most developing countries are faced
with the prospect of offseting a revenue
loss at least in the short run. The most
obvious way to do so is to raise general
consumption tax rates, but in low–income
countries, Baunsgaard and Keen (2005)
find that no more than 30 percent of the
reductions in trade tax revenues has been
recovered through increases in domestic
taxes. Policy makers in many countries
have also been reluctant to cut income tax
rates and to put more emphasis on domestic consumption taxes such as VAT in part
perhaps because they see such suggestions as little more than code for “increase

international advisors. Who is thinking
about what constitutes a good tax strategy
for a developing country and what they
think has changed. External advisors may
sometimes remain important in doing
background analysis and bringing world
experience to bear on the problems, but
their involvement in final decisions is
much diminished by comparison with
earlier times.
This tilt toward the developing country
knowledge base has important implications for tax policy matters. One would
expect a tendency toward more sensitivity to politics in deciding what reform
proposals will actually get to the table
for discussion, and less interest in more
risky comprehensive reforms than in
piecemeal adjustments. Foreign advisors,
who are insulated from local politics,
always tend to be more courageous than
elected officials both in their tax structure
recommendations and in their willingness to propose tax increases. Whether
this tilt will be good or bad for tax policy
in developing countries is an interesting
question, although not one anyone can yet
attempt to answer.
International Factors
The new global economy and capital
mobility are pushing tax structures away
from reliance on the corporation income
tax as capital moves more freely across
countries in response to relatively small
changes in interest rates and tax rates.
Indeed, though reflecting more the competitive international environment of
recent decades than the persuasiveness
of economists, income tax rates on both
persons and corporations have been
sharply reduced around the world. In
Latin America, for example, the average
tax rate on corporations fell from 41 percent in 1985 to 29 percent in 2003 and the
top rate on personal income from 51 to 28
27

For a recent review of the evidence in developed countries, see OECD (2008b).
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(domestic) investors in area B to the extent
the incentive increases the after–tax rate of
return. Targeted incentives are generally
the handiwork of bureaucrats, politicians,
and lobbyists who individually and collectively seldom have a good track record
in picking winners. Moreover, targeted
incentives may channel new investments
into low productivity sectors and dampen
the growth in value added.29
The new setting for tax reform casts
some doubt on these arguments. Tax bases
are not simply “given” to governments;
they can be “grown”—or destroyed—
through the manner in which a given tax
burden is collected. For example, taxes
may discourage, or encourage, the “formalization” of the economy, or they may
foster or discourage the growth of such
“tax handles” as imports, or they may be
used to shape and direct economic growth
into particular channels in a variety of
ways and for a variety of purposes (Bird,
2007).
A particular concern in this respect in
many developing countries today is the
appropriate treatment of the small and
medium enterprises (SME) sector. Since to
some extent this sector overlaps the informal sector, balancing the desire to facilitate the growth of such enterprises with
the need to collect revenues has led many
countries to institute relatively favorable
presumptive (or simplified) tax systems.
Unfortunately, most such systems have
been designed more on the basis of faith
than evidence. In at least some instances
countries may run the risk of bringing
into play a sort of Gresham’s Law under
which a bad tax system will erode the
basis of the normal tax system. Much work
remains to be done to understand these
issues.30

taxes on the poor.” Even those developing
countries (e.g., in Latin America) that did
follow this model for the most part have
seldom offset the potential revenue losses
of income tax rate reductions by base
expansions.28
There are other routes to revenue
recapture. Over time, one might expect
the revenue–enhancing effects of depreciation of the exchange rate (which may
accompany trade liberalization) and the
revenue–enhancing response of import
consumption to the lower tariffs to offset
much of the direct revenue loss (Ebrill,
Stotsky, and Gropp, 1999). Freer trade has
clearly bought great rewards in much of
the world. But increased rewards are usually accompanied by increased fiscal risk.
The long run may prove to be too long for
countries near the fiscal edge like some in
sub–Saharan Africa. Building sustainable
revenue systems in fragile low–income
countries continues to be a major policy
concern, as does ensuring the continued
provision of essential public services in
poor countries that remain highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the international
economy.
Tax Bases and Tax Rates
The traditional argument is that broader
bases are less distorting because they
can raise any given amount of revenue
at lower rates. Similarly, the standard
argument has long been that even where
there is a premium on attracting foreign
direct investment, a level playing field
with the lowest possible tax rate is to be
preferred to specific tax incentives. There
is good economic intuition behind this
argument. An incentive to (international)
investors in area A discriminates against
28

29
30

In contrast, developed countries that cut corporate rates usually did expand the tax base in compensation
(Norregaard and Khan, 2007).
See Bahl and Wallace (2007) for a discussion of the Jamaica case.
For a good introduction, see Alm, Martinez Vazquez and Wallace (2004) as well as the papers and presentations available at http://www.itdweb.org/SMEconference/.
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choices. Certain policy actions flow from
the concern about the potentially negative
effects of corruption. Such measures as the
following come to mind.

More generally, out there in the real
world most governments in developing
countries continue to offer expansive tax
incentive programs, for good reasons or
bad. Railing against such programs has
not proved much use: a more sensible
policy route in many countries is likely to
urge better management of incentive programs—for example, imposing a sunset on
each program with a provision for evaluation as a condition for continuation as well
as requiring annual estimation and reporting of the tax expenditures implied.31 That
no developing country seems to do these
things speaks volumes for the dominance
of politics in tax policy decisions—a reality
that is, of course, equally evident in many
developed countries.

•

•
Corruption
Corruption and taxation have always
been associated in history (Webber and
Wildavsky, 1986). Until recently, however,
the connection between the two was seldom discussed in public by policy advisers.
Things have changed. One hypothesis is
that there is some political limit to how
much tax people will bear in a developing country. If part of that “allocation” is
eaten up by corruption, the level of formal
taxation will be lower. Tanzi and Davoodi
(2000), Martinez–Vazquez, Granado, and
Boex (2007), and Bahl (2006) report some
empirical evidence of a substitution effect
between taxation and corruption. Corruption impacts on taxation in many ways.
Corruption in the form of bribes paid to tax
collectors erodes confidence in the tax system and encourages evasion. Moreover, the
presence of corrupt government officials
can dampen enthusiasm for upgrading the
quality of the tax administration through
increased compensation and training.
Corruption has become a significant
part of the discussion about tax structure
31

•

•

First, make the structure of each tax
as transparent as possible. Taxpayers
are harder to cheat when they fully
understand their taxpaying responsibilities. Nothing good can come of
a situation in which tax administrators and tax payers negotiate over
how large the tax liability should
be. One problem in the practice
of income taxation in developing
countries is that, apart from withheld taxes, tax liabilities are, in fact,
often negotiated.
Second, minimize the degree of
contact between taxpayers and tax
administrators, and move toward
self–assessment. VAT and payroll
taxes score relatively high in this
respect.
Third, reduce compliance costs.
This lowers the amount of bribe a
(rational) taxpayer might be willing
to pay to avoid the declaration and
payment process. Since on average
compliance costs are four to five
times higher in developing than in
developed countries (Evans, 2003)
they usually offer a more bribery–
friendly environment.
Increase the probability of detection.
To the extent corruption follows an
economic calculus, the expected
value of the outcome of taking a
bribe may be heavily influenced by
the chances of getting caught and
being heavily penalized.

Tax Administration, Yet Again
Of course recommendations like these
take us right back to the question of tax

For a good review of the bad incentives to be found around the world, see McLure (1999); for some suggestions on how to live more happily even with bad incentives, see Bird (2000).
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revenue boards that are outside the normal civil service salary/hiring/promotion
standards. Unfortunately, experience with
such boards to date does not suggest that
this is always or necessarily the best route
to a higher quality and more honest tax
administration (Bird, 2007).

administration. Problems in this area
remain an important limiting factor in
making tax policy choices in developing
countries. If anything, the new setting (or
at least the new advice) complicates matters. Consider the case of the individual
income tax. In the 1960s, the needed
reforms seemed clear: make more use of
third–party information to draw the informal sector into the tax net, simplify the
tax structure to reduce contact between
taxpayers and tax officials, and raise rates
to generate more revenue from the formal
sector. In the new setting, the large informal sector is still seen as the major constraint. However, if governments increase
taxes on wages, the result may be a further
impediment to the growth in the formal
sector of the economy (Rutkowski, 2007).
Revenue mobilization through increasing
effective rates is significantly tempered in
the new advice.
The tax treatment of small firms also
remains a problem. The presumptive tax
approach to assessing tax liability can
bring small enterprises into the tax net, but
may have a low revenue benefit–administrative cost ratio (Engelschalk, 2004).
As applied in practice, moreover, often
the result is to keep too many firms with
taxpaying capacity outside the normal
tax net (Bird and Wallace, 2004). Effective
taxation of both urban and rural real property, whether through capital gains taxes
or property taxes, also remains beyond
the ability of most developing country tax
administrations.32
In many countries, even when policy
makers want to do the fiscally right thing
the skill level of the tax administration
staff remains a problem in part because,
particularly in countries with growing
private sectors, the civil service cannot
retain qualified staff. Some countries
have recently attempted to circumvent
such problems by creating autonomous
32

Natural Resources
When it comes to natural resources, the
revenue issue has always been clear. In the
1960s the level of taxation in developing
countries was significantly related to the
share of GDP earned in the extractive
sector (Bahl, 1971). Similarly, energy
imports have long been heavily taxed
almost everywhere. In the new setting,
however, natural–resource issues take on
more significance, in three ways.
First, resource–rich countries are faced
with finding a way to tax the natural–
resource sector so as to generate “adequate” revenues without discouraging the
necessary inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to develop the resources. This
is not easy and forces some hard choices.
In earlier days, politicians would simply
negotiate an incentive package to attract
the FDI inflow. Because an announcement of new FDI was a political positive,
because the politicians making the deal
had short political lives and high discount
rates, and because of the risk a foreign
company would face in such an undertaking, the resulting incentive packages
were often viewed as too favorable to
the companies—particularly, of course,
when the outturn was very favorable. In
recent years, as natural–resource prices
have increased significantly (e.g., oil and
gold), countries are increasingly focused
on renegotiating the original contracts for
a larger share of higher profits. The contentious question on the table now is what
is a “fair share” for each party, and how

Two reviews of this issue, with country case studies, are Bird and Slack (2004) and Bahl, Martinez–Vazquez
and Youngman (2008).
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have identified strengthening subnational
governments as one item on their development policy agenda. Thus far, interest
has centered mostly on decentralizing
expenditure delivery. In some cases the
process has gone quite far; e.g., China
now makes 70 percent of all government
expenditures through its provincial and
local government budgets. The average
for all developing countries is a much
more modest 13 percent, but there is a
great deal of inter–country variation.
Empirical analysis has shown that the
expenditure decentralization ratio rises
with the level of economic development
and urbanization, and tends to be higher
in larger countries with more diverse
populations (Bahl and Wallace, 2005).
Many countries seem to see a growing
role for subnational governments in their
future, whether they view the prospect
with pleasure or otherwise.
The decentralization of taxes has
lagged in this process. Significant tax
assignment to subnational governments
is not uncommon in developed countries
(OECD 2006a). At one extreme, U.S. state
governments and Canadian provinces
have almost complete autonomy in choosing any tax base, so long as there is no
interference with interstate commerce. In
Denmark and Sweden, local taxes account
for nearly one–half of local government
spending. Revenues from subnational
government taxes in Switzerland are
greater in amount than revenues received
from grants. Japan has lagged other industrialized countries in the assignment of
taxes to local governments, but is now
introducing a new intergovernmental
reform that shifts taxing power significantly to local governments.
In most developing countries, however,
central governments have been reluctant
to release taxing powers to subnational
governments. The subnational government share in total taxes in developing
countries is only about ten percent by
comparison to 20 percent in industrialized

this can be estimated in the context of the
set of complicated business arrangements
that characterize almost all major resource
activities. The negotiated tax treatment of
natural–resource undertakings has again
become a big issue in many developing
countries, but the countries are in a much
stronger position than in earlier eras.
Second, the growing price of natural
resources, largely but not exclusively oil,
shows no sign of abating, reflecting both
political issues in some major producing
regions and continued heavy demand
from newly emerging industrial countries,
notably China. If countries tax energy
consumption and petroleum imports at
ad–valorem rates, tax bases and revenues
will expand. However, if countries are
locked into specific rates or subsidize the
price of motor fuels and the industrial
use of petroleum, they face unpopular
but necessary tax decisions. The need
for a more rational energy tax policy to
cope with these developments (as well as
environmental issues) poses a substantial
challenge for many, perhaps most, developing countries.
Third, natural–resource considerations
are also important on the expenditure side
of the budget. Rising natural–resource
prices will continue to force up the prices
of industrial, agricultural and government
inputs, as well as consumer goods. The
entry of China onto the international economic stage will continue to put pressure
on the price of minerals and oil, requiring many countries to increase taxes to
maintain the real level of public services.
On the other hand, the increased cost of
private production and consumer goods,
especially food, will certainly increase
resistance to tax increases.
Fiscal Decentralization and Property
Taxation
Another important component of the
new setting for tax policy is fiscal decentralization. Many developing countries
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governments have the potential to reach
below–threshold payroll, consumption
and real property wealth in ways that the
central government cannot.
If this hypothesis is correct, increases
in subnational government tax revenues
will not be offset by equal amount reductions in central government tax revenues.
Moreover, increased subnational revenue
mobilization could reduce the need for
intergovernmental transfers from central
revenues. In many countries, local governments to some extent do seem to have
broadened the tax base with a variety of
tax instruments and administrative measures, such as levies on the sales of assets
of firms, licenses to operate, betterment
charges and various forms of property
taxation. Subnational governments have
a comparative advantage when it comes
to some kinds of taxes. Often, for instance,
local governments oversee a variety of
licensing and regulatory activities and
track property ownership and land–based
transactions for a variety of reasons. They,
thus, have ample opportunity to identify
businesses in the community and to gain
some knowledge about their assets and
scale of operation. Moreover, because the
potential revenue is much more important
for them in relative terms, local governments have more incentive to carry out
such activities than do national governments.
Arguably, the most appropriate local
government revenue source is the property tax. Yet this tax has been underused
significantly in developing countries,
accounting for only about 0.6 percent
of GDP on average, compared to more
than 2 percent in industrialized countries
(Bahl and Martinez–Vazquez, 2008). One
constraint has been administration. To

countries. These figures have changed little in the last 30 years.33 Most subnational
government expenditures in developing
countries are financed through transfers.
In contrast, in a few developing countries,
like the Philippines, Brazil, and Colombia,
a third or more of subnational government
expenditure is financed from own–source
revenues. In these cases regional and/or
local governments usually have access to
some form of taxation on business transactions in addition to a property tax (Bird,
2003). The transitional countries are a
special case. They have always passed significant responsibility to subnational governments but usually devolved very little
revenue–raising power. China is perhaps
the extreme example, with subnational
governments having almost 70 percent of
expenditure responsibility, but essentially
no independent taxing power.
In the new setting, developing and
middle–income countries may be more
receptive to moving toward local government taxation, and particularly to the
property tax. With heightened international competition, there may continue
to be limits to what can be raised from
traditional central taxes, and involving
subnational governments more directly in
taxation can result in a greater overall rate
of revenue mobilization. Typically, central
governments rely on a combination of
company income tax, individual income
tax, value added tax, excises and customs
duties. In most developing countries,
however, these taxes have a high entry
threshold.34 Small firms, most individuals, and owners of immovable property
are under–represented in the tax base as
a result of both this administrative feature
and evasion. The revenue mobilization
hypothesis is essentially that subnational
33

34

Calculated from IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years, and from country studies (see Bahl
and Wallace, 2005).
See Keen and Mintz (2004) for discussion of the appropriate threshold with respect to value–added taxes:
these authors conclude, as do others, such as Bird and Gendron (2007), that the VAT threshold is too high in
most developing countries—a fact recently recognized in South Africa’s 2008 budget when the VAT threshold
was substantially increased.
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for low– and middle–income countries,
and as economists and others became
increasingly engaged in the exercise of
attempting to design and implement
improved taxation systems in developing
countries, both the scope of the problems
encountered and, to a lesser extent,
our understanding of the lessons to be
learned have changed. What have we
learned about taxation and development
from the extensive experience of the last
half–century?
First, something that is obvious, but
can always bear repeating, is that there
appears to be no necessary relationship
between tax levels and either income
levels or growth rates. Both “big governments” and “small governments” may
succeed; or they may fail.
Secondly, the last 30 years seem to show
fairly conclusively that for sustained
development it is not only desirable
but, over time, essential to keep tax and
expenditure levels close together. In this
sense most developing countries are now
“fiscally conservative”—and experience
suggests strongly that on the whole this
is a good thing for their people.
Thirdly, if we look a little more deeply,
it seems evident that it is in all likelihood
more important for both economic growth
and development (in the broader sense of
incorporating an increasing proportion of
the population in the growing prosperity)
that countries spend well than that they
tax well. Of course, this is subject to the
caveat we mentioned in the introduction
that one does not kill the golden goose
by overtaxation—whether the “goose”
be trade, investment, work effort, development of sound public and private
institutions, or any of the other factors
whose interplay determines economic
outcomes.
Fourthly, turning more specifically
to taxes, from a structural perspective,
it appears that the best way to ensure
that the goose thrives is for developing
countries to have a tax “portfolio” that

ratchet up the revenues from the property tax would require significant investment in surveys, valuation methods,
and recordkeeping, as well as aggressive
enforcement. Most developing countries
have not been willing to undertake this
kind of investment for the prospect of
gaining only a meager amount of revenue.
Another constraint has been the absence
of an incentive for local governments
to invest in upgrading the property tax,
owing to heavy inflows of central transfers to finance local expenditures. The
next decade could see significantly more
interest in property taxation in developing countries, if fiscal decentralization
proceeds and if central governments insist
on increased local revenue mobilization.
Property tax revenues often suffer owing
to their fragmented structure, i.e., a proliferation of taxes on essentially the same
base but administered separately under
different laws. In some circumstances
the new setting may result in rationalization of the system (annual property tax,
transaction taxes and duties, betterment
levies, capital gains taxes, etc.), with
ensuing administrative efficiencies and
revenue gains. Finally, there is the issue of
political resistance to a tax that is highly
visible, judgmentally administered and
levied against accrued gains. Local governments might be willing to take on this
resistance, if the revenue return is great
enough and if the incentives are correctly
set. In theory, the property tax might be
replaced by other productive forms of
local taxation; in most developing countries, however, while sales and income
taxes may sometimes be appropriate for
larger regional governments, perhaps
including metropolitan cities, there is not
much besides the property tax for small
local governments.
CONCLUSIONS
Over the last 50 years, as “developing” became increasingly a synonym
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(development from below35) may provide
a useful approach in many developing
countries. But that is a topic for another
day.

incorporates broad–based taxes on both
consumption and income, while keeping
effective rates on sensitive economic margins as low as possible. In recent decades,
the VAT has come to play an increasing
role in many developing countries, and
on the whole this has been a positive
development. However, income taxes
(Bird and Zolt, 2005; Barreix and Roca,
2007), excise taxes (Cnossen, 2005, 2006),
and property taxes (Bahl and Martinez–Vazquez, 2008) all have continuing
important roles to play in taxation for
development. There is still much work
for tax policy specialists in developing
countries.
Finally, there is even more work for tax
administration specialists—at least for the
perhaps rare specimens of this embattled
breed who lift up their heads from the
technical minutiae of their daily concerns
to consider carefully the society in which
the administrative system has to function.
No tax is better than its administration,
so tax administration matters—a lot.
This observation returns us to the first
lesson mentioned in the introduction.
Since few if any tax administrations can
long out–perform government administration in general, those concerned with
development must consider carefully not
only how different tax designs and different styles of tax administration affect
revenue, but also the extent to which
they facilitate and encourage better government. There is no silver bullet for tax
policy problems in developing countries.
But there may be different paradigms
that might help. Perhaps because we
are (in the terms introduced by Easterly
(2006)) “Searchers” who observe how
things work on the ground—as opposed
to “Planners” who stand above the
fray and consider how things “should”
work—we think that decentralization
35
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